

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 004509
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

66011
DRAFTED BY S/S:RGAMBLE
APPROVED BY S/S:RGAMBLE
-----080437Z 111038 /60
O 080338Z JAN 77 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 004509

NODIS
PRETORIA FOR EDMONDSON

FOLLOWING REPEAT DAR ES SALAAM 0076 ACTION SECSTATE 7 JAN
QUOTE

S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 0076

FOR THE SECRETARY AND SCHAUFLELE FROM EDMONDSON

E.O.11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, RH, TZ
SUBJECT: RICHARD SEES NYERERE AND OTHERS ON RHODESIA

1. SUMMARY: NYERERE TOLD RICHARD HE HAD NO PROBLEM IN SAYING
WAR WOULD CEASE WHEN AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WAS INSTALLED IN RHODESIA.
HE WAS REASONABLY SATISFIED WITH STRUCTURAL DETAILS OF RICHARD'S
PROPOSALS, BUT WOULD NOT INDICATE APPROVAL OF THEM WITHOUT CONSULTING
THE NATIONALISTS AND HIS FRONTLINE COLLEAGUES. HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT
HOW SMITH WOULD BE DEALT WITH AND HOW THE RHODESIAN ARMY WOULD BE
CONTROLLED. SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH KADUMA WAS SIMILAR.
TALK WITH SITHOLE FOUND HIM ALMOST TOO REASONABLE. RICHARD IS
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 004509

WEEKENDING IN NAIROBI, SEEING NKOMO-MUGABE IN LUSAKA MONDAY, SEEING
NYERERE IN DAR ES SALAAM AGAIN ON TUESDAY, AND MAY GO TO CAPE TOWN
THURSDAY JANUARY 13. HE PLANS TO EXTEND ADJOURNMENT OF GENEVA
CONFERENCE INDEFINITELY IN HOPES THAT FURTHER SHUTTLLING MAY
STRENGTHEN POSSIBILITY OF AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY

2. RICHARD STARTED HIS DEBRIEFING SESSION WITH ME THIS AFTERNOON
SAYING HE GOT WHAT HE WANTED FROM NYERERE: THAT NYERERE SAW NO
PROBLEM IN SAYING THAT THE GUERRILLA WAR WOULD CEASE WHEN AN INTERIM
GOVERNMENT IS INSTALLED. RICHARD WENT INTO THE DETAILS OF THE

BRITISH PROPOSALS WITH NYERERE, INCLUDING THE PROPOSED VOTING PROCEDURE ON MATTERS CONCERNING THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER'S RESIDUAL POWERS. ALTHOUGH NYERERE WOULD NOT APPROVE A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL WITHOUT CONSULTING HIS COLLEAGUES (PRESUMABLY OTHER FRONTLINE

PRESIDENTS AND THE NATIONALISTS), HE SEEMED REASONABLY SATISFIED WITH THE DETAILS, ASKING FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT THEM EXCEPT FOR SOME ABOUT HOW THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD WORK. HIS MAIN QUESTIONS, TO WHICH HE RETURNED A NUMBER OF TIMES, WERE ABOUT SMITH AND THE RHODESIAN ARMY. LIKE KAUNDA HE ALSO SAID THERE MUST BE A PRIME MINISTER IN THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE AFRICANS TO PRODUCE ONE.

3. NYERERE ASKED, "HOW DO WE MAKE SMITH IRRELEVANT," TO WHICH RICHARD SAID THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO HAVE THE HELP OF MR. VORSTER. BUT VORSTER CANNOT BE TRUSTED, NYERERE SAID, BECAUSE HE HAS RESTRICTIONS OF HIS OWN THAT HE MUST OVERCOME, INCLUDING THE SOUTH AFRICANS' KNOWLEDGE THAT THEY MAY BE NEXT. IN GENERAL, NYERERE WAS NOT AS UNDERSTANDING AS MACHEL ABOUT THE ROLE VORSTER MUST PLAY. AS DENNIS GRENNAN NOTED, "NYERERE IS NOT PREPARED TO THINK THE UNTHINKABLE, WHEREAS MACHEL IS A REALIST AND INSTINCTIVE SY

UNDERSTANDS."

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 004509

4. NYERERE REPEATEDLY ASKED, HOW DO YOU CONTROL THE ARMY, WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHO WILL BE IN CHARGE. IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE IS WORRIED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A SECOND UDI OR A COUP BY THE WHITE RHODESIAN ARMY. RICHARD APPARENTLY TREATED THESE AS UNLIKELY IF AN AGREEMENT WERE REACHED WITH VORSTER'S BACKING, BUT HE AND GRENNAN ADMITTED TO ME THAT THE BRITISH WERE UNLIKELY TO RESIST SUCH AN EVENT MILITARILY.

5. RICHARD ASKED IF NYERERE COULD GET THE LUSAKA MEETING TO MAKE A POSITIVE STATEMENT ABOUT THE BRITISH INITIATIVE. NYERERE SAID THAT IF IT WERE NOT RHODESIA THEY WERE DEALING WITH HE WOULD WELCOME THE BRITISH PROPOSAL FORMALLY, BUT RHODESIA WAS A SPECIAL CASE, AND THE PROBLEM WAS HOW TO DEAL WITH SMITH. SINCE NYERERE EARLIER INDICATED PLEASURE THE BRITISH WERE AT LAST WILLING TO GET INVOLVED, RICHARD ASKED NYERERE IF HE COULD NOT AT LEAST WELCOME THE BRITISH PRESENCE FORMALLY, PERHAPS BY SAYING HE WAS PLEASED THE BRITISH HAD AGREED TO HIS REQUEST THAT THEY ASSUME THIS RESPONSIBILITY. NYERERE SAID HE COULD NOT GET THE FOUR PRESIDENTS TO SAY SO BUT HE WOULD DO SO. IN FACT HE PREFERRED TO SAY IT ALONE RATHER THAN IN CONCERT.

6. IN AN EARLIER SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH KADUMA, RICHARD HAD COVERED MUCH THE SAME GROUND. KADUMA ASKED SIMILAR QUESTIONS AS NYERERE DID AND, LIKE BOTH NYERERE AND MACHEL, EXHIBITED SPECIAL INTEREST IN THE MATTER OF HOW TO BRING THE (WHITE RHODESIAN)

ARMED FORCES UNDER CONTROL.

7. RICHARD AND GRENNAN ALSO SAW SITHOLE IN DAR ES SALAAM. SITHOLE EXPRESSED NO PROBLEMS WITH THE BRITISH PROPOSALS AND "WAS SO REASONABLE IT WASN'T TRUE." HE SPOKE OF THE NEED OF ASSURANCES FOR THE WHITES, SAID THERE WOULD BE NO NATIONALIZATION OF PROPERTY, AND DESCRIBED THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT PERIOD AS A TIME OF RECONCILIATION. HE RAISED NO SERIOUS QUESTIONS, AND FOUND THE BRITISH IDEAS "TOTALLY ACCEPTABLE," ALTHOUGH HE WOULD DISCUSS THEM "WITH HIS BOYS IN LUSAKA." RICHARD AND GRENNAN LEARNED THAT NEITHER SITHOLE NOR MUZEREWA HAVE BEEN INVITED TO LUSAKA FOR THIS WEEKEND'S
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 004509

MEETINGS, BUT SITHOLE IS GONG TO LUSAKA IN ANY EVENT.

8. COMMENT: RICHARD AND GREN AN FELT THAT THEY COULD REASONABLY EXPECT THAT THE FRONTLINE PRESIDENTS WOULD COME OUT WITH A MUTED STATEMENT ABOUT THE WAR, AND RICHARD ADDED THAT HE WOULD BE "LIVID" IF THEY STRONGLY ENDORSED IT. I SUSPECT IT IS MORE LIKELY THE AFRICANS WILL ENDORSE CONTINUED MILITARY ACTION BUT LEAVE ROOM OPEN FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF THE WAR ENDING IF A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT WERE REACHED. RICHARD FELT THAT THE FOUR PRESIDENTS WERE ESSENTIALLY "ON BOARD" ON THE BRITISH PROPOSALS, BUT HE DID NOT DISAGREE WHEN I RECALLED THE POINTS MADE WHEN JOHN RIENHARDT WAS LAST IN LONDON AND SAID THAT AFRICAN AGREEMENT WITH THE BRITISH PROPOSALS WAS NOT REALLY ALL THAT SURPRISING; THE PROBLEM WAS GETTING SOMETHING VORSTER AND SMITH WOULD AGREE TO. RICHARD SAID IT WOULD BE A LONG PROCESS AND THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO TAKE IT STEP BY STEP. HE ADMITTED SMITH SHOWED NO SIGNS OF ACCEPTING THE CURRENT APPROACH BUT WAS ENCOURAGED BY VORSTER'S INTEREST, CONCLUDING THAT "THERE IS NOTHING ELSE WE CAN DO."

9. FUTURE PLANS: RICHARD AND PARTY ARE PROCEEDING TO NAIROBI THIS EVENING FOR A "WEEKEND OFF" IN NAIROBI. (THEY WILL PAY A "COURTESY VISIT ONLY" ON KENYATTA OR FOREIGN MINISTER WAIYAKI ON SATURDAY.) THEN THEY WILL FLY TO LUSAKA TO MEET MUGABE AND NKOMO ON MONDAY AFTERNOON JANUARY 10. RICHARD THOUGHT THEY MIGHT ALSO SEE KAUNDA; GRENNAN THOUGHT THEY PROBABLY WOULD NOT, AS KAUNDA WILL BE LEAVING FOR WEST AFRICA. THEY WILL THEN FLY TO DAR ES SALAAM FOR A TUESDAY MORNING MEETING WITH NYERERE WHO WILL INFORM THEM ABOUT THE LUSAKA MEETING. AFTER THAT THEY WILL EITHER RETURN TO NAIROBI FOR A DAY

OR GO TO PRETORIA, FLYING ON TO SEE VORSTER WHEN HE RETURNS FROM THE TRANSKEI THURSDAY JANUARY 13. BEYOND THAT THEY ARE UNCERTAIN BUT THINK THE PROCESS WILL TAKE SOME TIME LONGER. THEY MAY GO BACK TO SEE SMITH AFTER VORSTER. THEY ALSO PLAN TO VISIT LAGOS, BUT WILL RESERVE THAT FOR THE TRIP HOME AS THEY DO NOT WANT TO GET NIGERIA INVOLVED AT THIS STAGE. IN ANY EVENT RICHARD SAYS HE
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 004509

PLANS TO ANNOUNCE AN INDEFINITELY CONTINUED ADJOURNMENT OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE BEYOND JANUARY 17. HE WAS NOT VERY EXPLICIT ABOUT THE NEED FOR THIS BEYOND SAYING THAT IT MAY TAKE SOME TIME YET BEFORE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO MOVE ALL THE PARTIES TOWARD AGREEMENT.

10. WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT REPEATING COPIES THIS TEL FOR MY USE IN LUSAKA AND PRETORIA.
LEVIN UNQTE. KISSINGER

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

[illegible]

[illegible]

SAS ID: 368140
Secure: LOCK1

Status: NATIVE

Subject: RICHARD SEES NYERERE AND OTHERS ON RHODESIA

TAGS: PFOR, PDEV, RH, TZ, (NYERERE, JULIUS K), (RICHARD, IVOR)

To: LUSAKA PRETORIA

Type: TE

vdkgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/4f9684de-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc

Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld

Declassified/Released

US Department of State

EO Systematic Review

22 May 2009

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009